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Robust Social Decisions
By Eric Danan and Thibault Gajdos and Brian Hill and Jean-Marc
Tallon∗
We propose and operationalize normative principles to guide so-
cial decisions when individuals potentially have imprecise and het-
erogeneous beliefs, in addition to conflicting tastes or interests. To
do so we adapt the standard Pareto principle to those preference
comparisons that are robust to belief imprecision and character-
ize social preferences that respect this robust principle. We also
characterize a suitable restriction of this principle. The former
principle provides stronger guidance when it can be satisfied; when
it cannot, the latter always provides minimal guidance.
JEL: D71, D81
Keywords: Unambiguous preferences, Pareto dominance, Prefer-
ence aggregation, Social choice, Uncertainty
Public policies often yield uncertain outcomes. In order to evaluate the various
alternative policies and select an optimal one, policy makers need to rely on
some assessment of the probabilities of these outcomes. For some critical issues
such as climate change, however, this task is particularly challenging because the
uncertainty at hand is not well understood enough to allow a precise assessment
of the probabilities.1
A major issue is whether there will be significant global warming – for example,
∗ Danan: THEMA, Universite´ de Cergy-Pontoise, CNRS, 33 boulevard du Port, 95011 Cergy-Pontoise
cedex, France, eric.danan@u-cergy.fr. Gajdos: Greqam, CNRS, EHESS, Universite´ d’Aix-Marseille (Aix
Marseille School of Economics), Centre de la Vieille-Charite´, 2 rue de la Charite´, 13236 Marseille cedex
02, France, thibault.gajdos@univ-amu.fr. Hill: GREGHEC, CNRS, HEC Paris, Universite´ Paris-Saclay,
1 rue de la Libe´ration, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France, hill@hec.fr. Tallon: Paris School of Economics,
CNRS, 106 boulevard de l’Hoˆpital, 75013 Paris, France, jean-marc.tallon@univ-paris1.fr). An earlier
version of this paper was circulated under the title “Aggregating Tastes, Beliefs, and Attitudes under
Uncertainty”. We thank Marc Fleurbaey, Tzachi Gilboa, Peter Klibanoff, Fabio Maccheroni, Philippe
Mongin, Sujoy Mukerji, Klaus Nehring, Efe Ok, Marcus Pivato, Xiangyu Qu, David Schmeidler, Peter
Wakker, Ste´phane Zuber, and three anonymous referees, as well as participants to the D-TEA 2014
meeting, DRI seminar in Paris, workshop in Bielefeld University, and seminars at Columbia University,
Koc¸ University, Queen’s University Belfast, ETH-Zurich, University of Oslo, University of Warwick,
Bocconi University, and HEC Montre´al for useful comments and discussions. Danan thanks support
from the Labex MME-DII program (ANR-11-LBX-0023-01). Gajdos thanks support from the A?MIDEX
project (ANR-11-IDEX-0001-02) funded by the Investissements d’Avenir program. Hill thanks support
from the ANR DUSUCA (ANR-14-CE29-0003-01) and the Investissements d’Avenir program (ANR-11-
IDEX-0003/Labex Ecodec/ANR-11-LABX-0047). Tallon thanks support from ANR grant AmGames
(ANR-12-FRAL-0008-01) and from the Investissements d’Avenir program (ANR-10-LABX-93). The
authors declare that they have no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research
described in this paper.
1Besides climate change, Henry (2006) describes two other cases – asbestos and Creutzfeld-Jacob
disease – in which public actions had to be (or should have been in the case of asbestos) taken on
the basis of “uncertain science” (imprecise scientific knowledge). Manski (2013) discusses how relying on
“incredible certitude” can mislead policy analysis and argues instead for acknowledging partial knowledge
of individuals’ characteristics.
1
2 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
of 4◦C or more (relative to preindustrial levels) – which would have wide-ranging,
and unevenly distributed, consequences on economic activity, human settlement
and health around the world (IPCC, 2014). This depends on future concentrations
of greenhouse gases (GHG), which themselves depend on climate policy. Both of
these dependencies involve considerable uncertainty. On the one hand, climate
sensitivity to GHG concentrations is imperfectly understood and cannot as yet
be accurately described, even probabilistically, with full precision. Rather, a
range of probabilistic models are considered plausible by climate scientists (IPCC,
2013, Section 10.8). On the other hand, the effect of a given policy on GHG
concentrations depends, among other factors, on technological evolutions that
are highly unpredictable and for which any prediction is essentially subjective
(Stern, 2013; Pindyck, 2013). So different actors evaluating a given policy – say
the French and British governments evaluating a European climate policy – may
rely on different predictions and, hence, end up using different plausible ranges
for the probability of global warming reaching 4◦C under this policy – say 10%
to 50% and 40% to 60%, respectively. In such a situation, how should the policy
be evaluated at the European level?
This paper aims at providing guidance for such policy decisions. Situations of
this sort involve a “social” decision maker (the European Commission) who must
choose a policy whose outcome is uncertain and affects several “individual” actors
(the French and British governments). Individuals may have different utility
functions – or have heterogeneous “tastes” – and consider different probabilistic
models to be plausible – or have heterogeneous “beliefs”. Moreover, a given
individual may also consider more than one model to be plausible – or have an
imprecise belief. For such an individual, which of two policies yields the highest
expected utility may depend on the model considered. When a policy yields a
higher expected utility than another one for all plausible models, we say that the
individual unambiguously prefers the former policy to the latter. Unambiguous
preferences are thus robust to belief imprecision.2
The Pareto principle is a natural guide for such decisions. We propose a robust
version of this principle, requiring that if all individuals unambiguously prefer a
policy to another one then so should the policy maker. We show that this un-
ambiguous Pareto principle prescribes that the policy maker must only rely on
probabilistic models that are considered plausible by all individuals. In the exam-
ple above, this means that in order to guarantee that the implemented policy is
unambiguously Pareto optimal, the European Commission must restrict attention
to probabilities of global warming reaching 4◦C that belong to both the French
and British ranges – between 40% and 50%.
As this example illustrates, the policy maker can respect unambiguous Pareto
dominance even when individuals have heterogeneous beliefs, as long as these
2Such preferences are also called Bewley (2002) preferences. They are incomplete expected utility
preferences and are thus distinct from “robust” preferences in the sense of Hansen and Sargent (2001,
2008), which are complete non-expected utility preferences.
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE ROBUST SOCIAL DECISIONS 3
beliefs are compatible – at least one model is unanimously considered plausible.
Heterogeneous yet compatible beliefs arise naturally in some contexts.3 But they
are ruled out by the standard assumption that all individuals have precise beliefs
– each individual considers a single probabilistic model plausible. Under this
particular assumption, we recover the well-known result that the standard Pareto
principle can only be respected when all individuals have identical beliefs (Hylland
and Zeckhauser, 1979; Mongin, 1995, 1998).
When individuals have incompatible beliefs – no probabilistic model is unan-
imously considered plausible – the unambiguous Pareto principle yields no pre-
scription: whatever probabilistic models the policy maker takes as plausible, she
may end up implementing an unambiguously Pareto dominated policy. We there-
fore propose restricting this principle to policies that only involve outcomes on
which individual tastes are homogeneous. We show that this common-taste un-
ambiguous Pareto principle prescribes that the policy maker must only rely on
probabilistic models that are weighted averages of models considered plausible
by at least some individuals. Thus this common-taste restriction provides weaker
guidance than the unambiguous Pareto principle when individual beliefs are com-
patible – in the example above, it prescribes that the European Commission must
rely on probabilities between 10% and 60%. On the other hand, it still provides
guidance when beliefs are incompatible – it yields the same prescription if the
French range were narrowed to between 10% and 30%.
Except in a few special cases, neither the unambiguous Pareto principle nor its
common-taste restriction constrain the policy maker to rely on a single proba-
bilistic model. She may do so if she wishes, but she could also rely on a range
of models.4 A wider range of models results in a larger set of unambiguously
optimal policies and, consequently, allows the policy maker more flexibility in
selecting the policy to implement within this set. As we demonstrate, the set
of unambiguously optimal policies, however large, can be computed very simply.
Moreover, any policy selected within this set reflects a more or less cautious – or
conservative – attitude.
Section I introduces the formal setup for our analysis. Section II contains
the main results: characterizations of the unambiguous Pareto principle and its
common-taste restriction. Section III presents additional results on computing
the set of unambiguous optima and making a selection within this set. Section
IV discusses related literature. Proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
3For instance, if individuals’ beliefs originate from partial and distinct but mutually consistent pieces
of evidence, or from a common “baseline” probabilistic model that they do not fully trust.
4For instance, the common-taste unambiguous Pareto principle allows the policy maker to consider
plausible all models that at least one individual considers plausible, as recently proposed by Brunnermeier,
Simsek and Xiong (2014).
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I. Setup
A. Social decisions
Consider a society made of a finite number n of individuals. Let S be a finite
set of states of the world and X be a set of outcomes. Society (the social decision
maker) has to choose an act (a policy) f whose outcome f(s) ∈ X depends on
which state s ∈ S will occur. Let F denote the set of all acts, that is all functions
f : S → X. We identify an outcome x ∈ X with the constant act yielding
outcome x no matter which state occurs, thus viewing X as a subset of F .
An element of X specifies an outcome for all individuals in society. We assume
that X is a convex subset of some Euclidean space. One particular case is the
classical setting of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) where X is the set of lotteries
over some finite set of prizes. Another is when X is a convex subset of the set Rn
of monetary allocations or, more generally, of the set Rdn of allocations of a finite
number d of commodities. Since X is convex, given any two acts f, g ∈ F and
any coefficient λ ∈ [0, 1] there exists a “mixed” act λf + (1 − λ)g ∈ F yielding
outcome λf(s) + (1− λ)g(s) in each state s ∈ S.
B. Unambiguous preferences
Each individual i = 1, . . . , n has preferences over the acts in F , described by a
binary relation %i on F . That is to say, we write f %i g when individual i weakly
prefers act f to act g. As usual we use i to indicate strict preference and ∼i
for indifference. Society also has preferences described by a binary relation %0
on F . We assume that all these relations are unambiguous preference relations in
the following sense (we use the generic notation % when the subscript i can be
omitted).
DEFINITION 1: A binary relation % on F is an unambiguous preference rela-
tion if there exist a non-constant, affine utility function u : X → R and a closed,
convex set P of probability distributions on S, such that for all acts f, g ∈ F ,
f % g if and only if Ep(u(f)) ≥ Ep(u(g)) for all p ∈ P,
where Ep(u(f)) =
∑
s∈S p(s)u(f(s)) for all f ∈ F and p ∈ P .
P is interpreted as the set of all probability distributions (probabilistic models)
the individual (or society) considers a plausible description of the uncertainty
about the state of the world. When P contains a single probability distribution,
the agent has standard subjective expected utility (SEU) preferences and prefers
the act yielding the highest expected utility under this probability distribution.
When P contains multiple probability distributions, the agent only has an unam-
biguous preference between two acts when one act yields a higher expected utility
than the other under every distribution. If the act yielding the highest expected
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utility depends on which distribution in P is used, then the individual has no
unambiguous preference between the two acts.5
Unambiguous preferences were introduced by Bewley (2002). They satisfy all
the properties characterizing SEU preferences, except the completeness property.
The belief P is uniquely pinned down by the preference relation %, whereas
the utility function u is cardinally unique (i.e. unique up to a positive affine
transformation).
C. Taste heterogeneity
We focus on situations where individuals’ tastes or interests, as captured by
their respective utility functions, are not perfectly aligned. More precisely, we
shall assume that for each individual one can find two constant acts between which
this individual is the only one to have a strict preference (all other individuals
being indifferent). The profile (%i)ni=1 of individuals’ unambiguous preference
relations is said to satisfy c-diversity if for all i = 1, . . . , n, there exist x, y ∈ X
such that x i y whereas x ∼j y for all j = 1, . . . , n, j 6= i.6
C-diversity is known to be equivalent to the individuals’ utility functions being
linearly independent (note that this is only possible if X is at least n-dimensional;
Weymark, 1993). Thus individual tastes cannot be in full agreement, but neither
can they be in full disagreement. In fact c-diversity implies that the profile (%i)ni=1
satisfies the following c-minimal agreement property: there exist two constant
acts x, y ∈ X such that x i y for all i = 1, . . . , n.
II. Robust Pareto principles
This section contains the main results of the paper. We first state a robust
version of the standard Pareto principle and characterize its implications for social
preferences. We then consider a weakening of this robust principle to a particular
subset of acts, yielding a more general characterization.
A. Unambiguous Pareto dominance
The following is the most straightforward application of the Pareto principle in
our context. It simply states that if all individuals unambiguously prefer f to g,
then so should society.
DEFINITION 2: The social unambiguous preference relation %0 satisfies unam-
biguous Pareto dominance with respect to the profile (%i)ni=1 of individual unam-
biguous preference relations if for all acts f, g ∈ F , f %0 g whenever f %i g for
all i = 1, . . . , n.
5The individual may still come up with an overall preference judgment or reveal a behavioral dis-
position for one of the two acts; such a preference would simply not be unambiguous. See Section
III.
6This property, which is standard in the preference aggregation literature, is often named “indepen-
dent prospects”.
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The following characterization result shows that the unambiguous Pareto princi-
ple provides guidance as to which beliefs society may adopt, provided individuals’
beliefs are not too heterogeneous.
THEOREM 1: Let %i be an unambiguous preference relation on F with repre-
sentation (ui, Pi) for all i = 0, . . . , n. Assume (%i)ni=1 satisfies c-diversity. Then
%0 satisfies unambiguous Pareto dominance with respect to (%i)ni=1 if and only if
there exist a vector of weights θ ∈ Rn+, θ 6= 0, and a constant γ ∈ R such that
u0 =
n∑
i=1
θiui + γ and P0 ⊆
n⋂
i=1
θi>0
Pi.
Theorem 1 provides a way of aggregating individuals’ tastes and beliefs. The
social utility function is a utilitarian – or linear – aggregation of individuals’ utility
functions. This simply comes from applying the unambiguous Pareto principle to
the constant acts, where it reduces to the standard Pareto principle since beliefs
do not matter for the evaluation of these acts. It is thus a direct extension of
Harsanyi (1955)’s aggregation theorem.
More interesting is the way the social belief is constrained by individuals’. When
individual beliefs are compatible in the sense of having a non-empty intersection,
the social belief must lie inside this intersection. The unambiguous Pareto princi-
ple thus yields a strong but intuitive prescription: society must only use probabil-
ity distributions that all individuals consider plausible. This in particular implies
that society has a more precise belief than all the individuals. The condition that
the intersection of individuals’ beliefs is non-empty is not new in the literature; it
appears for instance in Rigotti and Shannon (2005), where it is needed to prove
that, absent any aggregate risk, the set of Pareto optima coincides with the set
of full insurance allocations.
If individual beliefs are incompatible – or have an empty intersection – then
some individuals have to be “excluded” as it were, i.e. given zero weight in the
social utility function. For instance, if all individuals have distinct precise beliefs,
then the only way for society to satisfy unambiguous Pareto dominance is that
its preferences coincide with those of a particular individual, who then acts as
a dictator. More generally, SEU individuals are either given zero weight or are
dictators: any individual with SEU preferences and a non-zero weight forces
society to have SEU preferences with her prior, in a way forcing her “certitude”
on the society.7
B. Common-taste unambiguous Pareto dominance
When individuals have incompatible beliefs and society does not wish to exclude
some of them, the unambiguous Pareto principle yields no prescription for society.
7A similar pattern was experimentally observed by Baillon, Cabantous and Wakker (2012).
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To recover some guidance in these situations, we now restrict this principle to acts
that are “consensual” in a particular sense.
Let us start with a situation where our notion of consensus takes a particularly
simple form. Consider two constant acts x, y ∈ X such that x i y for all
i = 1, . . . , n (such acts exist by c-minimal agreement) and two acts f, g ∈ F
that never yield an outcome different from x or y in any state. Such acts are
consensual in the sense that all individuals agree state by state on the ranking
of their respective outcomes: for all s ∈ S, f(s) is either unanimously “good”
– if it is x – or unanimously “bad” – if it is y – and similarly for g. Now if
f unambiguously Pareto dominates g then all individuals, notwithstanding their
incompatible and potentially imprecise beliefs, further agree that f is more likely
than g to yield the “good” outcome. Put differently, they would continue to
unanimously prefer f to g if they agreed to “pool” their beliefs – each of them
incorporating the others’ beliefs into her own.
More generally, we say that two acts are “common-taste” acts if all individuals
have the same cardinal preferences over their possible outcomes.8 Formally, given
an act f , let f(S) = {f(s) : s ∈ S} denote the image of f , i.e. the set of all possible
outcomes of f . Given a set Y of outcomes, let conv(Y ) denote the convex hull of
Y , i.e. the set of all convex combinations (or weighted averages) of outcomes in Y .
Two acts f and g are common-taste acts if x %i y is equivalent to x %j y for all
x, y ∈ conv(f(S) ∪ g(S)) and i, j = 1, . . . , n. Equivalently, f and g are common-
taste acts if all individual utility functions, once restricted to the set of all possible
outcomes of these two acts, are identical up to positive affine transformations.
DEFINITION 3: The social unambiguous preference relation %0 satisfies common-
taste unambiguous Pareto dominance with respect to the profile (%i)ni=1 of indi-
vidual unambiguous preference relations if for all common-taste acts f, g ∈ F ,
f %0 g whenever f %i g for all i = 1, . . . , n.
THEOREM 2: Let %i be an unambiguous preference relation on F with repre-
sentation (ui, Pi) for all i = 0, . . . , n. Assume (%i)ni=1 satisfies c-minimal agree-
ment. Then %0 satisfies common-taste unambiguous Pareto dominance with re-
spect to (%i)ni=1 if and only if there exist a vector of weights θ ∈ Rn+, θ 6= 0, and
a constant γ ∈ R such that
u0 =
n∑
i=1
θiui + γ, and P0 ⊆ conv
(
n⋃
i=1
Pi
)
.
The common-taste unambiguous Pareto principle thus allows aggregation of
unambiguous preferences even with incompatible beliefs. As in Theorem 1, society
can have SEU preferences even if all individuals have imprecise beliefs. The
8In the two-outcome situations discussed above there is no distinction between ordinal and cardi-
nal preferences. This is no longer true with more than two outcomes and requiring identical cardinal
preferences turns out to provide the relevant notion of common-taste acts for our purposes.
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opposite case is now also possible: society can have imprecise beliefs even if all
individuals have SEU preferences, in which case social belief imprecision results
from individual belief heterogeneity. Although more permissive than Theorem
1 in the way society’s beliefs could be related to individuals’, this result always
provides guidance for the construction of these beliefs.
REMARK 1: We would obtain the same characterization if we strengthened the
common-taste unambiguous Pareto principle by focusing on the “involved” indi-
viduals, in the spirit of Gilboa, Samuelson and Schmeidler (2014): individual i
is involved in the comparison between f and g if f(s) i g(s) for some s ∈ S.
That is, we would now say, more generally, that f and g are common-taste acts if
x %i y is equivalent to x %j y for all x, y ∈ conv(f(S) ∪ g(S)) and all individuals
i, j that are involved in f and g. Equivalently, f and g are common-taste acts if
all individual utility functions, once restricted to the set of all possible outcomes
of these two acts, are either identical up to positive affine transformations or
constant.
REMARK 2: Unlike Theorem 1, Theorem 2 does not require individual prefer-
ences to satisfy c-diversity but only c-minimal agreement. It is therefore applicable
to the particular case where all individuals have identical tastes.
III. Social optima and social choice
This section turns to the problem of choosing a socially optimal act among a
given set of feasible acts. We provide results helping society to compute the set
of optimal acts and make a further selection among them.
A feasible act is optimal if no other feasible act is strictly preferred to it. When
society has a precise belief p0, the socially optimal acts are thus simply those that
maximize expected social utility under p0. When society has an imprecise belief
P0, on the other hand, the set of socially optimal acts cannot be computed by
maximizing a single function, reflecting the incompleteness of the social unam-
biguous preference relation. However, we show that maximizing expected social
utility under each “interior” distribution in P0 separately always yields a lower
bound for – that is, a subset of – this set. Moreover, when the feasible set is
convex, doing so under all “boundary” distributions in P0 as well yields an upper
bound for this set. Finally, when the feasible set is polyhedral – determined by
a finite system of weak linear inequalities – the lower bound is actually an exact
characterization of the set of social optima.9
PROPOSITION 1: Let % be an unambiguous preference relation with represen-
tation (u, P ) and G be a subset of F . Then any act maximizing Ep(u(f)) in G for
some relatively interior p ∈ P is optimal for % in G. Conversely, if G is convex
then any optimal act for % in G maximizes Ep(u(f)) in G for some p ∈ P , and
9Aumann (1962, 1964) and Evren (2014) prove similar “scalarization” results in different settings.
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if G is polyhedral then any optimal act for % in G maximizes Ep(u(f)) in G for
some relatively interior p ∈ P .10
Once the socially optimal acts are identified, society may wish to select among
them by “completing” the social unambiguous ranking in a consistent way rather
than picking an act arbitrarily. Formally, we say that a binary relation %′ on F is
a completion of an unambiguous preference relation % on F if (i) %′ is complete,
(ii) f % g implies f %′ g for all f, g ∈ F , and (iii) x  y implies x ′ y for all
x, y ∈ X. As we next show, virtually any consistent completion can be interpreted
as evaluating the different acts with varying degrees of “caution” in the following
sense.
DEFINITION 4: A binary relation %′ on F is a variable caution choice rule for
an unambiguous preference relation % on F with representation (u, P ) if there
exists a function α : F → [0, 1] such that for all acts f, g ∈ F ,
f %′ g if and only if V (f) ≥ V (g),
where V (f) = α(f) minp∈P Ep(u(f)) + (1−α(f)) maxp∈P Ep(u(f)) for all f ∈ F .
The coefficient α(f) is interpreted as the degree of caution with which act f is
evaluated. It is unique whenever the minimal and maximal expected utilities of f
do not coincide (otherwise it is irrelevant), and independent of (u, P ). The most
cautious rule corresponds to α(f) = 1 for all f ∈ F (Gilboa et al., 2010). It is akin
to the precautionary principle, each act being evaluated by its minimal expected
utility. The least cautious rule corresponds to α(f) = 0 for all f ∈ F . More gener-
ally, taking α constant corresponds to the Hurwicz (1951) “optimism-pessimism”
criterion. Letting α vary with the act allows for more general rules. For instance,
choosing a distribution p′ ∈ P and taking α(f) = maxp∈P Ep(u(f))−Ep′ (u(f))maxp∈P Ep(u(f))−minp∈P Ep(u(f))
corresponds to a SEU rule.
PROPOSITION 2: If a binary relation %′ on F is a transitive, c-Archimedean
completion of an unambiguous preference relation % on F then it is a variable
caution choice rule for %.11
Transitivity requires the completion to rank acts in a consistent way. The
c-Archimedean property, on the other hand, is a mild continuity requirement.
When these two requirements are met, selecting among socially optimal acts thus
amounts to adopting a more or less cautious attitude towards social belief impre-
cision. The degree of social caution may depend on the act under consideration.
10A distribution p ∈ P is relatively interior if for every distribution q ∈ P , there exist a distribution
r ∈ P and a coefficient λ ∈ (0, 1) such that p = λq + (1− λ)r.
11A binary relation %′ on F is c-Archimedean if for all f ∈ F and x, y ∈ X such that x ′ f ′ y,
there exist λ, µ ∈ (0, 1) such that λx+ (1− λ)y ′ f ′ µx+ (1− µ)y.
10 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
REMARK 3: The converse of Proposition 2 does not hold: some variable caution
choice rules – or α functions – reverse some unambiguous rankings and hence
are not completions of it. The converse holds, however, for all the particular
cases discussed above. It holds, more generally, if the definition of a variable
caution choice rule is strengthened to further require that V (f) ≥ V (g) whenever
Ep(u(f)) ≥ Ep(u(g)) for all p ∈ P .
REMARK 4: Our definition of a variable caution choice rule is identical to
Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011)’s definition of a “generalized Hurwicz representa-
tion”, except that they require % to be derived from %′ in a specific way whereas
we more generally allow % to be any unambiguous preference relation admitting
%′ as a completion. Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011) show that any “monotonic
Bernoullian Archimedean” (MBA) preference relation admits such a representa-
tion.12 Any MBA preference relation is a transitive, c-Archimedean completion
of some unambiguous preference relation, but the converse is not true as MBA
preferences satisfy a stronger Archimedean property.
IV. Discussion and related literature
In this section, we further discuss the relationship between our main results and
the existing literature on social decisions. Whereas most of the literature assumes
SEU preferences, a recent strand of papers considers ambiguity-sensitive– or non-
expected utility – preferences.
A. Social decisions with SEU preferences
When individuals and society have SEU preferences and individual tastes are
heterogeneous, respecting Pareto dominance is impossible unless all individu-
als (with non-zero weight) have identical beliefs (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979;
Mongin, 1995, 1998, 2014). Theorem 1 generalizes this result to unambiguous
preferences. This generalization is partly a possibility result: the unambiguous
Pareto principle can accommodate simultaneous heterogeneity in tastes and be-
liefs, as long as beliefs are compatible. In the particular case where all individuals
have SEU preferences, it also yields the following corollary, showing that the as-
sumption that society has a precise belief is not necessary for the impossibility
result.
COROLLARY 1: Let %0 be an unambiguous preference relation on F and %i
be a SEU preference relation on F for all i = 1, . . . , n. Assume (%i)ni=1 satisfies
c-diversity. If %0 satisfies unambiguous Pareto dominance with respect to (%i)ni=1
then %0 is a SEU preference relation.
12The MBA class includes virtually all popular ambiguity models, such as maxmin expected utility
(MEU; Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), Choquet expected utility (CEU; Schmeidler, 1989), smooth
ambiguity (Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji, 2005), variational (Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini,
2006), and multiplier (Hansen and Sargent, 2001) preferences.
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Gilboa, Samet and Schmeidler (2004) restrict the Pareto principle to “common-
belief” acts, i.e. acts whose outcome only depends on events to which all indi-
viduals assign the same probability. In the setting of Savage (1954), they show
that this restriction allows aggregation of SEU preferences with heterogeneous
tastes and beliefs, and requires the social belief to be a weighted average of the
individuals’. In an Anscombe-Aumann setting, Qu (2015) obtains the same char-
acterization by restricting the Pareto principle to common-taste acts. These two
restrictions have the same flavor of allowing society to ignore “spurious” unanim-
ities (that is, cases where individuals agree for opposite reasons), which are the
source of the impossibility. The Savage setting features a rich set of states, making
the common-belief restriction stronger, whereas the Anscombe-Aumann setting
features a rich set of outcomes, making the common-taste restriction stronger.
Theorem 2 generalizes Qu (2015)’s result to unambiguous preferences.13
Gilboa, Samuelson and Schmeidler (2014) say that an act f no-betting Pareto
dominates an act g if f Pareto dominates g and there exists a probability dis-
tribution p on S such that Ep(ui(f)) ≥ Ep(ui(g)) for every involved individual
i (their definition requires strict inequality, but this weak version is more di-
rectly comparable to ours). Their definition can be generalized to unambiguous
preferences by requiring unambiguous Pareto dominance instead of Pareto dom-
inance. Gayer et al. (2014) say that an act f unanimity Pareto dominates an
act g if Epj (ui(f)) ≥ Epj (ui(g)) for all involved individuals i, j. Their definition
(which again requires strict inequality) can also be generalized to unambiguous
preferences by requiring that Epj (ui(f)) ≥ Epj (ui(g)) for all individuals i, j and
all probability distributions pj ∈ Pj . Common-taste unambiguous Pareto dom-
inance then implies unanimity unambiguous Pareto dominance, which itself im-
plies no-betting unambiguous Pareto dominance and in turn unambiguous Pareto
dominance. Moreover, the last two are equivalent when individual beliefs are com-
patible. Finally, Theorem 2 implies that it is equivalent for a social unambiguous
preference relation to respect either one of the first two when c-minimal agreement
holds.
Brunnermeier, Simsek and Xiong (2014) propose a belief neutral social welfare
criterion that essentially consists in a social unambiguous ranking whose belief
is the convex hull of the individuals’. This corresponds to the particular case
of Theorem 2 where individuals have SEU preferences and society has the least
complete unambiguous preferences satisfying common-taste unambiguous Pareto
dominance. The common-taste unambiguous Pareto principle thus provides foun-
dations for a generalization of their criterion allowing, on the one hand, for more
precise social beliefs – or more complete social preferences – and, on the other
hand, for imprecise individual beliefs.
13Note that Qu (2015) also defines common-taste acts more narrowly as those yielding only convex
combinations of two exogenously fixed outcomes between which individuals have a unanimous strict
preference. Our more general definition yields the same characterization while retaining a stronger
Pareto principle. See also Billot and Vergopoulos (2014) for a different resolution of the impossibility
through an extension of the state space.
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B. Social decisions with ambiguity-sensitive preferences
When individuals and society have ambiguity-sensitive preferences and individ-
ual tastes are heterogeneous, respecting Pareto dominance becomes impossible
even when all individuals have identical beliefs. This has been shown in various
settings covering in particular the class of MBA preferences (Gajdos, Tallon and
Vergnaud, 2008; Herzberg, 2013; Chambers and Hayashi, 2014; Mongin and Pi-
vato, 2015; Zuber, 2015). In contrast, Theorems 1 and 2 show that unambiguous
preferences allow the aggregation of imprecise beliefs.
Moreover, our results can be used to obtain positive aggregation results for
ambiguity-sensitive preferences as well. Indeed, an ambiguity-sensitive preference
relation naturally induces a “revealed unambiguous preference” relation, cap-
turing the part of the preference ranking that is not affected by the ambiguity
the individual perceives (Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci, 2004; Nehring,
2007; Klibanoff, Mukerji and Seo, 2014). For a MBA preference relation %, this
revealed unambiguous preference relation %∗ is an unambiguous preference rela-
tion in the sense of Definition 1, and % is a variable caution choice rule for %∗. %
can therefore be represented by a triple (u, P, α) where (u, P ) is as in Definition
1 and α is as in Definition 4.14 The function α is then interpreted as reflecting
the individual’s attitude towards the ambiguity she perceives.
We may therefore restrict the Pareto principle as follows: say that the social
preference relation %0 satisfies revealed unambiguous Pareto dominance with re-
spect to the profile (%i)ni=1 of individual preference relations if the social revealed
unambiguous preference relation %∗0 satisfies unambiguous Pareto dominance with
respect to the profile (%∗i )ni=1 of individual revealed unambiguous preference re-
lations. This principle, and its restriction to common-taste acts, are then charac-
terized as in Theorems 1 and 2, respectively. Note that these characterizations do
not involve the functions αi and thus relate the individuals’ and society’s beliefs
independently of their ambiguity attitudes. We explicitly state the latter result.
COROLLARY 2: Let %i be a MBA preference relation on F with representation
(ui, Pi, αi) for all i = 0, . . . , n. Assume (%i)ni=1 satisfies c-minimal agreement.
Then %0 satisfies common-taste revealed unambiguous Pareto dominance with
respect to (%i)ni=1 if and only if there exist a vector of weights θ ∈ Rn+, θ 6= 0, and
a constant γ ∈ R such that
u0 =
n∑
i=1
θiui + γ and P0 ⊆ conv
(
n⋃
i=1
Pi
)
.
Several particular specifications of this general characterization have been stud-
14Note that in this approach % is the only primitive relation whereas %∗ is derived from %. Note also
that the definition of %∗ – or, equivalently, of P – by Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004) and
Nehring (2007) does not necessarily coincide with that by Klibanoff, Mukerji and Seo (2014), the former
being generally more complete.
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ied within various subclasses of MBA preferences. Cre`s, Gilboa and Vieille (2011),
Nascimento (2012), Hill (2012), and Gajdos and Vergnaud (2013) assume that in-
dividuals have identical tastes. Allowing for taste heterogeneity, Qu (2015) char-
acterizes a strengthening of the common-taste Pareto principle within the MEU
and CEU classes. Alon and Gayer (2015) assume that individuals have SEU
preferences whereas society has MEU preferences and characterize the unanimity
Pareto principle.
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Mathematical Appendix
A1. Preliminaries
Given a utility function u : X → R and a probability distribution p on S, define
the “state-dependent utility” function wu,p : X×S → R by wu,p(x, s) = p(s)u(x).
Given a set P of probability distributions on S, let Wu,P = {wu,p : p ∈ P}. Let
C =
{
c ∈ RX×S : c(x, s) = c(y, s) for all x, y ∈ X and s ∈ S}
denote the set of “state-dependent constant” functions. Let cone(·) denote conic
hull.
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LEMMA 1: Let %i be an unambiguous preference relation on F with represen-
tation (ui, Pi) for all i = 0, . . . , n. Assume (%i)ni=1 satisfies c-minimal agreement.
Then %0 satisfies unambiguous Pareto dominance with respect to (%i)ni=1 if and
only if
Wu0,P0 ⊆
n∑
i=1
cone (Wui,Pi) + C.(A1)
PROOF:
X has a finite affine basis Xˆ since it is a subset of a Euclidean space. Given
a state-dependent utility function w : X × S → R, denote by wˆ its restriction to
Xˆ × S. Given a set W of such functions, denote by Wˆ the set of corresponding
restrictions. Then (A1) is equivalent to
Wˆu0,P0 ⊆
n∑
i=1
cone
(
Wˆui,Pi
)
+ Cˆ.(A2)
It follows from a straightforward generalization of Danan, Gajdos and Tallon
(2015)’s aggregation theorem that %0 satisfies unambiguous Pareto dominance
with respect to (%i)ni=1 if and only if Wu0,P0 is included in the closure of the right
hand side of (A2). Hence it suffices to prove that this right hand side is closed. We
first show that cone(Wˆui,Pi)+ Cˆ is a closed, convex cone for all i = 1, . . . , n. That
it is a convex cone is easily checked. For closedness, note that 0 /∈ Wˆui,Pi since
ui is non-constant and, hence, cone(Wˆui,Pi) is closed since Wˆui,Pi is compact and
convex (Rockafellar, 1970, Corollary 9.6.1). Moreover, cone(Wˆui,Pi) ∩ Cˆ = {0}
and, hence, cone(Wˆui,Pi)+ Cˆ is closed as well (Rockafellar, 1970, Corollary 9.1.3).
It remains to show that the sum of these closed, convex cones is itself closed. As
explained in Danan, Gajdos and Tallon (2015), this will be the case if there exist
two acts f, g ∈ F such that, for all i = 1, . . . , n and all gi ∈ F such that f %i gi,
there exist g′i ∈ F and λi ∈ (0, 1) such that f %i g′i and g = λigi + (1− λi)g′i. To
establish this property, recall that by c-minimal agreement, there exist x, y ∈ X
such that x i y for all i = 1. . . . , n. Hence, for all i = 1, . . . , n, there exists an
open neighborhood Yi of y in X such that x i z for all z ∈ Yi. Let gi ∈ F
such that x %i gi and, given a coefficient λ ∈ (0, 1), let g′i = 11−λy − λ1−λgi. Then
y = λgi+(1−λ)g′i. Moreover, since S is finite, there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) small enough
so that g′i ∈ Y S ⊂ F and, hence, x i g′i(s) for all s ∈ S. It follows that x %i g′i.
A2. Proof of Theorem 1
The “if” part is easily checked. For the “only if” part, assume %0 satisfies
unambiguous Pareto dominance with respect to (%i)ni=1. Restricting attention
to the constant acts, unambiguous Pareto dominance reduces to standard Pareto
dominance. We can therefore apply Harsanyi (1955)’s aggregation theorem (for a
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rigorous proof in our setting, see de Meyer and Mongin, 1995) to obtain θ ∈ Rn+
and γ ∈ R such that u0 =
∑n
i=1 θiui + γ. θ and γ are unique by c-diversity.
Moreover, θ 6= 0 since u0 is non-constant.
It remains to prove that for all p0 ∈ P0 and all i = 1, . . . , n such that θi > 0,
p0 ∈ Pi. To this end, note that by Lemma 1, there exist (pi)ni=1 ∈
∏n
i=1 Pi,
θ′ ∈ Rn+, and c′ ∈ C such that
wu0,p0 =
n∑
i=1
θ′iwui,pi + c
′.
It follows that
p0(s)u0(x) =
n∑
i=1
θ′ipi(s)ui(x) + c
′(s)(A3)
for all s ∈ S and x ∈ X, where c′(s) stands for c′(x, s) since the latter is indepen-
dent of x. Summing over S yields
u0(x) =
n∑
i=1
θ′iui(x) +
∑
s∈S
c′(s)
for all x ∈ X, so that θ = θ′ and γ = ∑s∈S c′(s). Hence (A3) implies that
p0(s)(u0(x)− u0(y)) =
n∑
i=1
θipi(s)(ui(x)− ui(y))
and, hence, that
n∑
i=1
θi(p0(s)− pi(s))(ui(x)− ui(y)) = 0(A4)
for all s ∈ S and x, y ∈ X. Fix an individual i such that θi > 0. By c-diversity,
there exist x, y ∈ X such that ui(x) > ui(y) whereas uj(x) = uj(y) for all
j = 1, . . . , n, j 6= i. By (A4), it follows that p0(s) = pi(s) for all s ∈ S, so that
p0 = pi ∈ Pi.
A3. Proof of Theorem 2
The “if” part is easily checked. For the “only if” part, assume %0 satisfies
common-taste unambiguous Pareto dominance with respect to (%i)ni=1. As in
the proof of Theorem 1, we first restrict attention to the constant acts to obtain
θ ∈ Rn+, θ 6= 0, and γ ∈ R such that u0 =
∑n
i=1 θiui + γ.
It remains to prove that for all p0 ∈ P0, there exist (pi)ni=1 ∈
∏n
i=1 Pi and
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λ ∈ ∆n such that p0 =
∑n
i=1 λipi. By c-minimal agreement, there exist x, y ∈ X
such that x i y for all i = 1, . . . , n. Hence all acts in conv({x, y})S are common-
taste acts. It follows that x 0 y, so that individual and social preferences all
agree on conv({x, y}). Hence for all i = 1, . . . , n, there exist ai ∈ R+, ai > 0, and
bi ∈ R such that
ui(z) = aiu0(z) + bi(A5)
for all z ∈ conv({x, y}). We can therefore use the common-taste unambiguous
Pareto principle to show, as in the proof of Theorem 1, that for all p0 ∈ P0, there
exist (pi)
n
i=1 ∈
∏n
i=1 Pi, θ
′ ∈ Rn+, and c′ ∈ C such that
p0(s)u0(z) =
n∑
i=1
θ′ipi(s)ui(z) + c
′(s)(A6)
for all s ∈ S and z ∈ conv({x, y}). Summing over S and using (A5) yields
u0(z) =
n∑
i=1
θ′iui(z) +
∑
s∈S
c′(s) =
n∑
i=1
θ′iaiu0(z) +
n∑
i=1
θ′ibi +
∑
s∈S
c′(s)
for all z ∈ conv({x, y}), so that ∑ni=1 θ′iai = 1 and ∑ni=1 θ′ibi = −∑s∈S c′(s) since
u0 is non-constant on conv({x, y}). Hence (A6) implies that
p0(s)(u0(x)− u0(y)) =
n∑
i=1
θ′ipi(s)(ui(x)− ui(y)) =
n∑
i=1
θ′ipi(s)ai(u0(x)− u0(y))
and, hence, that
p0(s) =
n∑
i=1
θ′iaipi(s)
for all s ∈ S, so that p0 =
∑n
i=1 θ
′
iaipi. Let λ = (θ
′
iai)
n
i=1 ∈ Rn. Since θ′i ≥ 0 and
ai > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n and
∑n
i=1 θ
′
iai = 1, we have λ ∈ ∆n.
A4. Proof of Proposition 1
First, let G be any subset of X and let g ∈ arg maxf∈GEp(u(f)) for some
relatively interior p ∈ P . We show that g is optimal for % in G. Suppose not, i.e.
there exists f ∈ G such that f  g. It must then be that Ep(u(f)) = Ep(u(g))
whereas Eq(u(f)) > Eq(u(g)) for some q ∈ P . Moreover, since p is relatively
interior in P , there exist r ∈ P and λ ∈ (0, 1) such that p = λq + (1 − λ)r, i.e.
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r = 11−λp− λ1−λq. It follows that
Er(u(f)) =
1
1− λEp(u(f))−
λ
1− λEq(u(f)) <
1
1− λEp(u(g))−
λ
1− λEq(u(g)) = Er(u(g)),
contradicting f  g.
Next, assume G is convex and g ∈ G is optimal for % in G, i.e. there exists no
f ∈ G such that f  g. We show that g ∈ arg maxf∈GEp(u(f)) for some p ∈ P .
Let
A =
{
v ∈ RS : there exists f ∈ G such that v(s) = u(f(s))− u(g(s)) for all s ∈ S} ,
B =
{
v ∈ RS : Eq(v) > 0 for all q ∈ P
}
.
Then A is convex since G is convex and u is affine, and B is a convex cone whose
dual cone is cone(P ). Moreover, since g is optimal for % in G, A and B must
be disjoint by Definition 1. Hence by a separation argument (Rockafellar, 1970,
Theorem 11.3), there exists p ∈ RS , p 6= 0, such that∑
s∈S
p(s)b(s) ≥ 0 ≥
∑
s∈S
p(s)a(s).
for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B. The former inequality implies that p ∈ cone(P ), so
we can assume without loss of generality that p ∈ P . The latter inequality then
implies that Ep(u(g)) ≥ Ep(u(f)) for all f ∈ G.
Finally, assume G is polyhedral and g ∈ G is optimal for % in G, i.e. there
exists no f ∈ G such that f  g. We show that g ∈ arg maxf∈GEp(u(f)) for
some relatively interior p ∈ P . Define A as above and let
B′ =
{
v ∈ RS : Eq(v) ≥ 0 for all q ∈ P
}
.
Then A is polyhedral since G is polyhedral and u is affine, and B′ is a closed,
convex cone whose dual cone is cone(P ). Since A is polyhedral and 0 ∈ A,
cone(A) is a closed, convex cone (Rockafellar, 1970, Corollary 19.7.1). We also
have B′ = B′1+B′2 where B′1 is the lineality space of B′ and B′2 is a pointed, closed,
convex cone orthogonal to B′1. Since B′2 is pointed, there exists a compact, convex
set D ⊂ B′2, 0 /∈ D, such that cone(D) = B′2 and, hence, cone(B′1 + D) = B′.
Moreover, since g is optimal for % in G, we have A ∩ B′ ⊆ B′1 by Definition 1
and, hence, A and B′1 + D must be disjoint since 0 /∈ D. Hence by a separation
argument (Rockafellar, 1970, Corollary 20.3.1), there exists q ∈ RS , q 6= 0, and
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ε ∈ R such that ∑
s∈S
q(s)b(s) > ε ≥ 0 ≥
∑
s∈S
q(s)a(s).
for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B′1 +D. It follows that there exists an open neighborhood
Q of q such that, for all r ∈ Q,∑
s∈S
r(s)b(s) ≥ 0 ≥
∑
s∈S
r(s)a(s).
for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B′. The former inequality implies that Q ⊂ cone(P ), so
we can assume without loss of generality that q ∈ P . By definition, Q must
then contain a relatively interior p ∈ P . The latter inequality then implies that
Ep(u(g)) ≥ Ep(u(f)) for all f ∈ G.
A5. Proof of Proposition 2
Assume %′ is a transitive, c-Archimedean completion of an unambiguous pref-
erence relation % on F with representation (u, P ). First note that since %′ is a
completion of % and by Definition 1, we have
x %′ y if and only if x % y if and only if u(x) ≥ u(y)(A7)
for all x, y ∈ X. For all f ∈ F , let xf ∈ arg maxs∈S u(f(s)) and yf ∈ arg mins∈S u(f(s)).
This is well-defined since S is finite. We then have
u(xf ) ≥ max
p∈P
Ep(u(f)) ≥ min
p∈P
Ep(u(f)) ≥ u(yf ).
Since X is convex and u is affine, there then exist x′f , y
′
f ∈ conv({xf , yf}) such
that u(x′f ) = maxp∈P Ep(u(f)) and u(y
′
f ) = minp∈P Ep(u(f)). It follows that
x′f % f % y′f by Definition 1 and, hence, x′f %′ f %′ y′f since %′ is a completion
of %.
We now show that there exist α(f) ∈ [0, 1] such that
f ∼′ α(f)y′f + (1− α(f))x′f .
If f ∼′ x′f or f ∼′ y′f then we are done, so assume x′f ′ f ′ y′f . By (A7), we
then have u(x′f ) > u(y
′
f ). Let
L = {λ ∈ [0, 1] : λy′f + (1− λ)x′f %′ f},
M = {µ ∈ [0, 1] : f %′ µy′f + (1− µ)x′f}.
We then have L ∪ M = [0, 1] since %′ is complete. Moreover, for all λ ∈ L
and µ ∈ M , we have λy′f + (1 − λ)x′f %′ µy′f + (1 − µ)x′f since %′ is transitive
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and, hence, u(λy′f + (1 − λ)x′f ) ≥ u(µy′f + (1 − µ)x′f ) by (A7). Since u is affine
and u(x′f ) > u(y
′
f ), this is only possible if λ ≤ µ. It follows that supL = inf M .
Finally, L and M are closed since %′ is c-Archimedean and, hence, supL = maxL
and inf M = minM . Hence, letting α(f) = maxL = minM and zf = α(f)y
′
f +
(1− α(f))x′f , we have f ∼′ zf .
Finally, let V (f) = u(zf ). Since u is affine, we then have
V (f) = α(f)u(y′f ) + (1− α(f))u(x′f ) = α(f) min
p∈P
Epu(f)) + (1− α(f)) max
p∈P
Ep(u(f)).
Moreover, since %′ is transitive and by (A7), we have
f %′ g if and only if zf %′ zg if and only if V (f) ≥ V (g)
for all acts f, g ∈ F , which completes the proof.
